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Legal Reasoning: Interpreting and Applying the Law1) 
When analysing the process of legal decision-making what might first 
come to mind is the dichotomy between the interpretation and the 
application of the law. These terms, in some circumstances, may be 
employed interchangeably due to the strong link that exists between them. 
Indeed, jurisdictional clauses in investment treaties refer cumulatively to 
“disputes over the interpretation or application of the treaty” giving the 
impression of creating a “portmanteau category” [Franklin Berman, 
‘International Treaties and British Statutes’ (2005) 26 StatuteLRev 1, 10.] 
that may not require the competent tribunal to distinguish the one from 
the other. However, this distinction is important as it creates two linked but 
functionally separate spheres. 
Interpretation of legal norms is a hermeneutic process through which the 
meaning of a norm is determined. The concept of “application” can itself 
be divided into two categories: stricto sensu application (application in its 
narrow context), and lato sensu application (application in a broader 
context which contains both the process of interpretation and the process 
of application stricto sensu). As put by Judge Ehrilich, interpretation is the 
course of “determining the meaning of a rule” whereas application stricto 
sensu is the method of “determining the consequences which the rule 
attaches to the occurrence of a given fact”. [Case concerning the Factory at 
Chorzow, PCIJ, Claim for indemnity-Jurisdiction, (Dissenting opinion of 
judge Ehrilich) 39.] 
In the investment arbitration scene, Sir Franklin Berman, in his dissenting 
opinion in the Lucchetti annulment phase, makes reference to the 
Tribunal’s twofold task: 
“[…] interpreting the BIT and then applying it; […] whereas treaty 
interpretation can often be a detached exercise, it is virtually inevitable that 
treaty application will entail to some extent an assessment of the facts of the 
particular case and their correlation with the legal rights and obligations in 
play”. (para 15) 
However, this traditional distinction between the interpretation and 
application of the law is not always a straightforward task in practice. In 
some circumstances, the interpretation may be formed based on how this 
interpretation will apply to the facts. In other clear-cut cases, the treaty 
provisions are applied to the facts directly without the need for the 
determination of the meaning of the provision. 
Nevertheless, leaving aside the practical difficulties, the dyadic approach to 
legal decision-making which marks the separation between the process of 
interpreting and applying the law can become crucial. As an example, the 
quality of reasoning may vary based on whether the arbitrators make 
reference only to the process of applying the law to the facts or whether 
there is also reference to the legal interpretation process. 
  
The Vienna Convention-Based Interpretative Arguments 
The question that arises at this point, is what tools investment arbitrators 
use in order to interpret the law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) constitutes the main point of reference when decision-
makers interpret international treaties. Article 31(1) VCLT provides that 
international treaties must be interpreted in “good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Treaty interpretation in 
this context includes the following approaches: the textual approach 
(ordinary-plain meaning of the text), the contextual approach, the 
teleological approach, the relevant rules of international law applicable to 
the parties, and the negotiating history. This process may be followed in 
practice step-by-step but there is also the view that considers the 
application of Article 31 as one combined rule rather than a number of 
directions to be applied in a specific order. 
International courts and tribunals resort to the VCLT interpretive principles 
for diverse reasons. Apart from consisting a source of guidance as they 
provide the tools for interpreting treaties, they may also serve as a 
technique that enables the decision-maker to enhance the credibility of the 
award’s reasoning entrenching the legal interpretation process within the 
long tradition of public international law. These well recognised and 
universally-adopted rules of interpretation confer to investment arbitration 
tribunals a place in the long interpretive tradition of international courts 
and tribunals. 
  
The Precedent-Based Interpretive Arguments 
However, the VCLT-based arguments are better described as a means to an 
end rather than as the end itself. Even though there is no formal doctrine 
of precedent, practice shows that arbitrators also refer to relevant case law 
when interpreting the law. Since there is no set rule regarding the form 
precedent has in investment arbitration, the practice of citing prior awards 
and decisions by arbitrators has been connected to the civil law doctrine 
of ‘jurisprudence constante’. In this context, prior decisions have a 
persuasive authority, meaning that arbitrators can follow prior awards if 
they are convinced by the strength of the award’s reasoning. Persuasive 
authority has the potential to persuade without constraining the decision 
making power of the adjudicator. 
Despite Article 53 ICSID Convention clearly stating that the award shall be 
binding only between the parties, arbitration tribunals have relied on prior 
awards when examining issues such as the clause on Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET) or the obligation of the States to compensate damages. It 
has become common practice not only for governments and private 
investors to refer to prior investment awards that figure to favour them, 
but also for investment tribunals to rely upon awards of other tribunals 
when interpreting similar provisions of investment treaties. 
Investment arbitration tribunals refer to previous awards in order to form 
their own legal reasoning through following a principle well established in 
the jurisprudence, to fill in gaps in the treaty as well as to draw analogies 
and a contrario arguments. A prominent example of the reasons behind a 
tribunal’s reference to case-law can be found in the AES Corporation v. 
The Argentine Republic decision on jurisdiction. The Tribunal stated that 
“it may consider decisions on jurisdiction dealing with the same or very 
similar issues […] in order to compare its own position with those already 
adopted by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by 
one or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the 
same solution”. (para 30) 
The Tribunal continued by mentioning that another reason for considering 
precedents, even when the cases had been seised on a basis of another 
BIT, is that a tribunal “has set a point of law which, in essence, is or will be 
met in other cases whatever the specificities of each dispute may be”.  On 
this basis precedents can be considered as a matter of “comparison” and 
“inspiration”. 
Similarly, the Enron tribunal focused on the “correctness” of the ICSID 
decisions as a justification for referring to them despite not being “a 
primary source of rules”: 
“The citations of and references to those decisions respond to the fact that the 
Tribunal in examining the claim and arguments of this case under 
international law, believes that in essence the conclusions and reasons of 
those decisions are correct”. *(para 40) 
Likewise the Chevron Tribunal held that it will consider arbitral decisions 
and the parties’ arguments based on these decisions “if they shed any 
useful light on the issues that arise for decision in this case”. 
Tribunals refer not only to investment arbitration case law but also to 
national and international jurisprudence. Equally, legal issues arising in 
comparative public law regimes such as administrative, constitutional, and 
international, aim at introducing solutions for arbitral decision-making in 
investment arbitration whenever there is a gap or need for guidance. 
Proportionality, for example, is a principle integrated and developed in 
investment arbitration through the dialogue with international and 
domestic legal orders and judicial bodies. In the Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed SA case, the Tribunal relied on the 
jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, referring to 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 in order to draw guidance for the use of the 
proportionality analysis in determining whether a legitimate regulation 
turned in fact into indirect expropriation. 
The human rights law discipline, as well as any chosen interlocutor, may be 
a useful source of guidance but what should be kept in mind is that the 
nature of the rights accorded by each discipline is different. It is still 
disputable, for example, whether investment treaties accord erga 
omnes substantive rights such as human rights treaties do. Moreover, the 
investment treaties constitute a type of political risk management tool for 
the investor and this function should also be taken into account. Another 
caveat to this cross-referencing practice is that reference to “foreign” 
jurisprudence should avoid the danger of “faux amis” by selecting carefully 
the points of reference based on the submissions of the parties and the 
relevance of the case law. 
  
A Culture of Arbitral Decision-Making 
Whether it involves the use of the traditional VCLT interpretive principles or 
a combination of convention-based principles with cross-citation 
references, understanding the interpretation practices within a specific legal 
community is a first step towards the knowledge of the law. Going a step 
further, the process arbitrators follow to interpret the law becomes not 
only an issue of legal knowledge but also curves the path towards 
identifying the culture of arbitral decision making and the way this culture 
has been shaped through the practice of arbitral tribunals in order to 
respond to the needs of the arbitration community. 
  
 
